Wealth, power, and equal protection: How the 14th Amendment shapes economic justice
By Jake Isakoff
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution, ratified in 1868, stands as a cornerstone in the nation’s pursuit of equality and justice. Its Equal Protection Clause mandates that no state shall “deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” While this clause is instrumental in combating discrimination based on race, gender, and other inherent characteristics, its application to economic disparities—particularly those rooted in wealth—presents a complex and evolving legal landscape.
The Supreme Court has historically been hesitant to classify economic status as a suspect classification warranting heightened scrutiny. A suspect classification refers to a group of people who, due to certain characteristics, are considered to be at a higher risk of being subjected to discrimination or unfair treatment by the government. The Equal Protection Clause imposes a restraint on the governmental use of suspect classification.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez (1973), the Court addressed a challenge to Texas’s public school financing system. This system was based on local property taxes and resulted in significant funding disparities between wealthy and impoverished districts. The plaintiffs argued that this system disadvantaged students in poorer districts, violating the Equal Protection Clause. The Court, however, declined to recognize education as a fundamental right and did not consider the poor a suspect class—applying a rational basis review and ultimately upholding the financing system.
Despite the reluctance to elevate economic status to a suspect classification in Rodriguez, the Court acknowledges other scenarios where wealth-based discrimination infringes upon fundamental rights, thereby necessitating stricter scrutiny.
The intersection of wealth and the criminal justice system is a focal point for the Court, particularly concerning the right to a fair trial and equal access to justice. In Griffin v. Illinois (1956), the Court held that states must provide trial transcripts to indigent defendants seeking appellate review, emphasizing that “there can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has.” Indigent defendants are those too poor to afford a lawyer and who are eligible for court-appointed legal representation. In this case, the Supreme Court essentially made clear that states cannot deny indigent defendants the right to appeal a criminal conviction solely because they cannot afford a trial transcript, as this was in violation of not only the Equal Protection Clause, but the Due Process Clause as well.
Similarly, in Bearden v. Georgia (1983), the Court ruled that revoking probation for failure to pay a fine, without considering the defendant’s ability to pay, violated the Equal Protection Clause. The Court asserted that punishing someone solely for their poverty is incompatible with the principles of justice.
The use of monetary bail has been scrutinized for perpetuating wealth-based discrimination as well. Critics argue that requiring cash bail for pretrial release disproportionately detains indigent defendants, not because they pose a flight risk or danger to society, but because they lack financial resources. This practice raises concerns about equal protection under the law, as it effectively creates a two-tiered justice system based on economic status.
In In re Humphrey (2021), the California Supreme Court addressed this issue, ruling that detaining individuals solely due to their inability to afford bail is unconstitutional. The court emphasized the necessity of considering non-monetary alternatives and assessing an individual’s ability to pay when determining bail conditions.
The Court also intervened when economic barriers impeded the fundamental right to vote. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections (1966), the Court struck down Virginia’s poll tax, concluding that making the affluence of a voter, or payment of any fee, an electoral standard violates the Equal Protection Clause. This decision underscored the principle that wealth should not be a determinant in one’s ability to participate in the democratic process.
Educational opportunities have also been examined through the lens of wealth and equal protection. While Rodriguez declined to recognize education as a fundamental right, subsequent cases have addressed related issues. For instance, in Plyler v. Doe (1982), the Court invalidated a Texas statute denying funding for education to undocumented immigrant children. This highlighted the critical role of education in maintaining societal cohesion, and the potential harm of denying it based on economic or legal status. The ruling held that states cannot deny students a free public education based on their immigration status, as such actions once again violate the Equal Protection Clause.
The judiciary’s approach to wealth-based discrimination reflects an ongoing tension between deference to legislative judgments and the protection of fundamental rights. While the Court refrains from designating economic status as a suspect classification, it recognizes that in certain contexts, such as access to justice, voting, and fundamental societal benefits, wealth disparities can implicate equal protection concerns.
This nuanced stance suggests a recognition that economic barriers can, in effect, deny individuals the full benefits of citizenship and equal participation in society. However, the reluctance to apply heightened scrutiny universally to wealth-based classifications indicates a cautious approach, balancing concerns of judicial overreach with the imperative to uphold constitutional guarantees.
Thus, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause serves as a vital safeguard against discrimination, yet its application to economic disparities reveals the complexities inherent in constitutional interpretation. Through various rulings, the Supreme Court acknowledged that while wealth is not a suspect classification per se, certain deprivations rooted in economic status, especially those affecting fundamental rights, demand careful judicial scrutiny. As society continues to grapple with issues of inequality and access, the interplay between wealth and equal protection remains a critical area for legal examination and advocacy.
